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Abstract
Background: While the COVID-19 outbreak in China now appears suppressed, Europe
and the USA have become the epicentres, both reporting many more deaths than China.
Responding to the pandemic, Sweden has taken a different approach aiming to mitigate,
not suppress, community transmission, by using physical distancing without lockdowns.
Here we contrast the consequences of different responses to COVID-19 within Sweden,
the resulting demand for care, intensive care, the death tolls and the associated direct
healthcare related costs.
Methods: We used an age-stratified health-care demand extended SEIR (susceptible, ex-
posed, infectious, recovered) compartmental model for all municipalities in Sweden, and
a radiation model for describing inter-municipality mobility. The model was calibrated
against data from municipalities in the Stockholm healthcare region.
Results: Our scenario with moderate to strong physical distancing describes well the ob-
served health demand and deaths in Sweden up to the end of May 2020. In this scenario,
the intensive care unit (ICU) demand reaches the pre-pandemic maximum capacity just
above 500 beds. In the counterfactual scenario, the ICU demand is estimated to reach
20 times higher than the pre-pandemic ICU capacity. The different scenarios show quite
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different death tolls up to 1 September, ranging from 5000 to 41 000, excluding deaths
potentially caused by ICU shortage. Additionally, our statistical analysis of all causes ex-
cess mortality indicates that the number of deaths attributable to COVID-19 could be in-
creased by 40% (95% confidence interval: 0.24, 0.57).
Conclusion: The results of this study highlight the impact of different combinations of
non-pharmaceutical interventions, especially moderate physical distancing in combina-
tion with more effective isolation of infectious individuals, on reducing deaths, health
demands and lowering healthcare costs. In less effective mitigation scenarios, the de-
mand on ICU beds would rapidly exceed capacity, showing the tight interconnection be-
tween the healthcare demand and physical distancing in the society. These findings have
relevance for Swedish policy and response to the COVID-19 pandemic and illustrate the
importance of maintaining the level of physical distancing for a longer period beyond the
study period to suppress or mitigate the impacts from the pandemic.
Key words: COVID-19, corona virus, SARS-CoV-2, epidemiology, epidemic, outbreak, pandemic, infections, care
demand, intensive care demand, deaths, mortality, excess mortality, Sweden
Introduction
The novel SARS-CoV-2 is highly transmissible.1 It has rap-
idly spread around the globe since it first emerged in
Wuhan, China,2 at a rate much faster than other emerging
infectious diseases such as Ebola.3 In response to the
COVID-19 outbreak, China implemented extraordinary
public health measures at great socio-economic cost. They
moved swiftly to ensure early identification of cases, with
prompt laboratory testing, facility-based isolation of all
cases, contact tracing and quarantine.4 In the community,
physical distancing was implemented at a grand scale, all
mobility put to an halt, and the city of Wuhan was in lock-
down for about 9 weeks.5 China’s tremendous efforts
showed success.6 Other Asian countries facing a major ex-
plosion, such as South Korea, also managed to curb the ep-
idemic. South Korea employed very liberal testing,
hospital-based isolation of all cases, combined with exten-
sive contact tracing enhanced by mobile phone and digital
technologies, but did not use a lockdown.7,8
While the outbreak in China appears to be contained,
since mid-March 2020, the epicentre of the COVID-19
pandemic is in Europe, and since April in the USA.
There is thus an urgent need to determine how best to
reduce transmission rates, the height of the epidemic
peak, the peak demand on healthcare services and how to
reduce fatalities.
Key Messages
• We find that physical distancing and isolation of infectious individuals without lockdown is effective in mitigating
much of the negative direct health impact from the COVID-19 pandemic in Sweden, but has a higher death toll com-
pared with other Scandinavian countries who did implement a lockdown.
• It appears that Sweden has managed to ensure, by implementation of physical distancing initiated from the end of
March, that intensive care unit (ICU) demands do not exceed ICU capacities and that deaths are substantially reduced
compared to several alternative scenarios.
• In the counterfactual scenario, the intensive care unit demand is estimated to be 20 times higher than the intensive
care capacity in Sweden and the number of deaths would be between 40000 to 70 000.
• Under current mitigation strategies, the health impacts, and their associated cost are, however, still substantial, and are
likely to continue to rise unless the virus is suppressed, or eliminated. In the mitigation and suppression scenarios, in-
cluding the scenario fitting best to data from Sweden by the end of May 2020, there is an obvious risk of resurgence of
the epidemic unless physical distancing, shielding of the elderly and home isolation are effectively sustained.
• A statistical analysis of excess mortality for all causes of death indicates that the number of deaths attributed to
COVID-19 could be increased by 40%.
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In the absence of vaccines, a wide range of control
measures can be considered to contain or mitigate COVID-
19. These include active case finding with prompt isolation
of cases, contact tracing with quarantine of contacts,
school closures and closures of public places, mobility
restrictions, physical distancing in the community, physical
distancing only of the elderly and lockdowns (also known
as Cordon sanitaire).4 There is currently no consensus
about which measures should be considered, in which
combination, and at which epidemiological threshold such
measures should be implemented for maximum public
health impact.9
Two strategies can be considered: (i) suppression that
aims to rapidly reverse epidemic growth, thereby reducing
case numbers to low levels, and (ii) mitigation which fo-
cuses on slowing but not necessarily immediately stopping
epidemic spread—reducing peak healthcare demand while
shielding those most at risk of severe disease from infec-
tion. Each policy has major challenges. Suppression aims
to rapidly reduce the reproduction number, R0, to <1, thus
causing case numbers to consistently decline. Mitigation
aims to slow spread by reducing R0 to a value close to but
slightly >1 for some time before the epidemic growth will
cease gradually, partially in reponse to increasing levels of
disease immunity in the population.
Public health measures need to be weighed against eco-
nomic repercussions and mental illness caused by pro-
longed lockdown. Although more strict community
containment measures such as lockdowns will result in a
shorter duration of the outbreak,10 the non-health sector
negative consequences may be huge.
Sweden decided to implement public health interven-
tions without a lockdown. Schools and universities were
not closed, restaurants and bars remained open, instead
Swedish citizens implemented ‘work from home’ policies
where possible, social distancing without police enforce-
ment and shielding of those >70 years of age.
Here we aim to quantify the effects of the Swedish
measures. We estimate the impact of COVID-19 on the
Swedish population at the municipality level, considering
demography and human mobility under various scenarios
of mitigation and suppression. We estimate the time course
of infections, health care needs, and mortality in relation
to Swedish intensive care unit (ICU) capacity, as well as
the costs of care, and compared alternative policies and a
counterfactual scenario.
Methods
We developed a compartmental epidemiological model
based on the SEIR (susceptible, exposed, infectious, recov-
ered) formulation, and extended it to account for
additional variables including compartments for health
and ICU care. All these variables were age-structured (0–
59, 60–79 and 80þ years). The model included age-
structured compartments for susceptible, exposed,
infected, inpatient care, ICU care, dead and recovered pop-
ulations based on Swedish population data at the munici-
pality level (see Supplementary Information 1, available as
Supplementary data at IJE online). Overall, the population
of infected individuals was divided into two different
groups, those that had sufficiently severe symptoms to po-
tentially end up in hospital care (21.6%), and those who
had mild or asymptomatic infections or were sick at home
(78.4%).11,12 This parameter was calibrated to data. The
model allowed for three different ways that deaths could
occur: (i) after unsuccessful ICU treatment; (ii) after rou-
tine triage and denial of ICU due to low chances of surviv-
ing or when ICU demand exceeds ICU capacity; and (iii)
outside of healthcare.
The model captured spatial demographic heterogene-
ities at the level of municipality in Sweden, and inter-
municipality travelling based on a radiation model (see
Supplementary Information 1). The radiation model was
calibrated using a N1H1 Influenza A model and data for
the period 2015–18 in Sweden. Demographic data were
obtained at the municipality level for the year 2018 from
Statistics Sweden.
The parameterization of the model was achieved in two
ways: (i) some parameters were set to fixed values based
on what is known through literature and data; (ii) some
parameters were given initial values from the international
literature and then calibrated by fitting the model to cur-
rent available outbreak-data on infection prevalence, sero-
prevalence, deaths, ICU load and healthcare in the
Stockholm region. The full set of parameter values are
given in the Supplementary Table S1.1, available as
Supplementary data at IJE online. Age-specific health-care
need parameters from Ferguson et al.13 were initially used
to represent the three age groups in our study
(Supplementary Table S1.2, available as Supplementary
data at IJE online). These values were then calibrated to
better reflect observed infection prevalence, seropreva-
lence, in-patient care demand, ICU care demand and regis-
tered deaths due to COVID-19 from the Stockholm region
and Sweden (See Supplementary Table S1.2).
The infectious period is likely to vary by individual and
range from days to weeks. Viral shedding is reported to oc-
cur from 7 to 22 days, including in mild cases of disease,14
and is a driver of disease transmission. Isolation of
patients, or staying home if presenting with symptoms, will
reduce transmission to contacts and is a key strategy to
contain COVID-19. It shortens the period that infected
persons are able to infect others. Importantly, transmission
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from an infected but asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic in-
dividual can still occur despite control measures.15 We as-
sumed that the average effective infectious period in the
general population is 5 days, shortened from 7 days by nat-
ural isolation of symptomatic infected individuals. We as-
sumed that individuals going into healthcare were
admitted on average after 3 days of symptomatic infection
and were isolated from transmitting the virus to other indi-
viduals while in hospital care.
We used an observed sample of virus prevalence positiv-
ity from the Stockholm region to validate the model predic-
tions. The virus prevalence was measured by nucleic acid
detection by a PCR method in nasopharyngeal specimens
from the general population in the Stockholm region.
Sampling was conducted for about 1 week centred around
the 1 April and was managed by the Swedish Public Health
Agency. The measurement indicated 2.5% [95% confi-
dence interval (CI) ¼ 1.4–4.2 %] of the population was
infected.16 To calibrate the infection prevalence in the
model with the study result, considering virus is detectable
for an average of 12 days, which goes beyond the average
infectious period, we adjusted the model by allowing a la-
tent compartment for the period virus is detectable after
the infectious period.17 We further calibrated the model to
samples of seroprevalence estimated in the Stockholm re-
gion, estimating 7.3% of the population had cumulatively
been exposed to the virus up to the first half of April (7
April).18
We calibrated the daily transmission rate, b; to
0:892 cðtÞ based on Swedish data for the Stockholm region
on healthcare load, virus prevalence, seroprevalence and
mortality (Supplementary Information 1), where c tð Þ is a
time dependent contact-rate scaling parameter
(Supplementary Information 1). In our model, R0 is depen-
dent on contact-rate and infectious period, whose parame-
ters in turn are dependent on age-distribution (see
Supplementary Information 1). Accordingly, we account
for spatial and demographical heterogeneity in R0.
Country-level R0 values are estimated as an average of the
municipality specific R0 values. It is not within the scope of
the paper to derive exact values for R0, yet we can see that
the within-municipality R0, for the no-countermeasures
scenario [i.e. scenario (a), see below], is within the range
2.67–4.45, and this range is consistent with the reported
basic reproduction rates for COVID-19.1 The country-
level R0 is given by an average over municipality-local R0
values. Due to the many travellers infected with SARS-
CoV-2 arriving from Italy, Austria and other parts of
Europe, in the week of the 24 February, the model was
seeded with 1 case per 100 000 individuals for all munici-
palities except for the municipalities within the
Stockholm region that were seeded with 1 case per 50 000
individuals.
The model was set up to predict the municipality trans-
mission dynamics and inter-municipality spread across
Sweden starting from 24 February and ending a little more
than 6 months later, 1 September 2020. The model used
scenarios to describe the countermeasures and counterfac-
tual impacts. The mitigation and suppression scenario had
onset on 20 March by a transient function with full effect
by early to mid-April (Supplementary Table S1.1). The five
different scenarios are summarized by:
(a) no public health interventions (counterfactual scenario);
(b) modest physical distancing in ages 0–59 years, moder-
ate in ages 60þ years;
(c) modest physical distancing in ages 0–59 years, moder-
ately strong in ages 60þ years;
(d) moderate physical distancing in ages 0–59 years, very
strong in ages 60–79 years, strong in ages 80þ years, and
with an increased degree of isolation of infectious
individuals;
(e) moderate physical distancing in ages 0–59 years, strong
in ages 60þ years, and further improved isolation of in-
fectious individuals.
A complete description of the scenarios is provided in
the Supplementary Information 1.
In the scenarios the ICU capacity was compared against
twice the baseline availability of 526 ICU beds in Sweden,
as this was doubled in response to the COVID-19 pan-
demic. The numbers of deaths and the infection fatality
rate (IFR) associated with the different mitigation and
supression scenarios were derived from our model. We
also derived the direct healthcare cost for each of the sce-
narios (see Supplementary Information 4, available as
Supplementary data at IJE online).
Additionally, we extracted total all-cause of deaths
from the Stockholm region and made statistical estimates
of the excess mortality beyond confirmed COVID-19
cases. This was done by comparing the excess mortality
during the COVID-19 outbreak with the mortality the
weeks before the outbreak for the same and previous years
by applying time series regression methods while adjusting
for time trends and the patterns of deaths in previous
months and years (Supplementary Information 3, available
as Supplementary data at IJE online).
Results
The model showed good agreement with the reported
COVID-19 related deaths in Stockholm up to the end of
May 2020, in scenario (d) (Figure 1). In Table 1 we
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Figure 1 Predicted number of total deaths from COVID-19 in the whole population in Sweden (first column), and for Stockholm region (second col-
umn); predicted demand of ICU beds in Stockholm (third column), and; inpatient care beds in Stockholm (fourth column). Actual observations in the
early phase of the outbreak are illustrated as circles (O). The scenarios are organized in rows with panel (a) no public health interventions (counterfac-
tual scenario); (b) modest physical distancing in ages 0–59 years, moderate in ages 60þ years; (c) modest physical distancing in ages 0–59 years,
moderately strong in ages 60þ years; (d) moderate physical distancing in ages 0–59 years, very strong in ages 60–79 years, strong in ages 80þ years,
and with an increased degree of isolation of infectious individuals; (e) moderate physical distancing in ages 0–59 years, strong in ages 60þ years, and
further improved isolation of infectious individuals. Mitigation giving rise to these predicted values had onset the 20th of March.
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present the R2 and the mean square error of the observa-
tions to the predictions for scenarios (a)–(e) in relation to:
deaths for Sweden as a whole, deaths in Stockholm, ICU
bed demand in Stockholm and in-patient care in
Stockholm. Scenario (d) further describes well the obser-
vation that 2.5% of the population in Stockholm was
infected with the SARS-CoV-2 virus centred around 1
April, as well as the antibody prevalence (Figure 2).
Overall, the IFR for Sweden in scenarios (a)–(e) is esti-
mated to 0.46; 0.44; 0.42; 0.34 and 0.30 %, respectively
(Table 1). In Stockholm the IFR is estimated to 0.38,
0.37, 0.35, 0.30, 0.27 % for scenarios (a)–(e)
respectively.
In Figure 3 we present the scenarios of country level
COVID-19 ICU bed demand over time in Sweden for the
different age groups, and in total. According to scenario
(a), the outbreak would peak at the end of April and reach
an ICU bed demand >10 000 patients (Figure 3a). The
group <60 years of age alone would take up more than the
baseline ICU resources of 526 beds during a month at the
peak. According to scenario (b), the ICU demand would
peak at around 9000 beds at the peak around 1 May
(Figure 3b). The demand would be flattened and continue
for a longer period. The ICU demand for those <60 years
of age would again exceed the baseline ICU beds for
1 month. According to scenario (c), the ICU bed demand
would peak at 7000 at the peak around 1 May
(Figure 3c). The demand would be flattened and continue
for a longer period. The ICU bed demand for those aged
<60 years would almost take up the baseline ICU beds for
a period slightly <1 month. According to scenario (d), the
intensive care demand would increase just beyond 500, it
would peak in April and decrease gradually to low levels in
August (Figure 3d). According to scenario (e), the intensive
care demand would be <300 for the whole study period
(Figure 3e). We note that the outbreak would likely resurge
unless there were other means were to control the trans-
mission when the countermeasures are lifted in scenarios
(d) and (e). Corresponding estimates for the Stockholm re-
gion are given in Figure 4a–e. It is noteworthy that the
healthcare demand peaks slightly earlier in Stockholm as
compared with Sweden as a whole.
In Supplementary Information 2, available as
Supplementary data at IJE online, we show how the timing
of the increase in cases across the scenarios (a)–(e) pre-
sented in Figure 2 is sensitive to mobility between munici-
palities (Supplementary Figure S2.1, available as
Supplementary data at IJE online). There is a slightly ear-
lier increase in ICU bed demand with higher inter-
municipality mobility.
In Table 2 we describe the predictions of the total num-
ber of individuals infected, the total person days of care,
the total person days of ICU occupancy, the total number
of deaths (assuming all ICU demands are satisfied) and the
deaths from ICU capacity shortage (100% above baseline
level). Following on this, we estimate the direct costs of the
care and intensive care demands (Table 3). The number of
infected individuals in Sweden is predicted very high by the
model in scenarios (a)–(c) with the cumulative number of
infected people in the population already >90% by 1
September 2020 (Table 2). In scenarios (d) and (e), only
2.4 and 1.7 million people, respectively, would be infected
by 1 September.
Overall, the scenarios show that the demand on inpa-
tient care varies from just <1 000 000 person-days to just
>100 000 person-days, whereas the demand on intensive
care ranges from 350 000 to 30 000 person-days. The
death rates, assuming no limits in ICU, varies from
40 000 to 5000 depending on the mitigation and suppres-
sion actions. Assuming instead a cap on the ICU bed capac-
ity of 100% above baseline, the estimated number of
additional excess deaths from lack of ICU capacity varies
from 29 000 to 0 depending on the scenario. The total di-
rect medical cost ranges between 26 billion and 3 billion
Swedish krona (SEK) depending on the scenario (Table 3).
A statistical time series analysis of the total all-cause
mortality in Stockholm indicates that due to possible mis-
diagnosis, an additional 0.40 (95% CI: 0.24, 0.57) deaths
could be attributed to covid-19 and added to the confirmed
COVID-19 cases (Supplementary Information 3).
Table 1 Estimates of R2 and root-mean-square error (RMSE) for the different model scenarios of observations from Sweden and
Stockholm, along with the resulting infection fatality ratio (IFR) for Sweden
Scenario Deaths Sweden Deaths Stockholm ICU Stockholm In-patient care Stockholm IFR Sweden (%)
R2 RMSE R2 RMSE R2 RMSE R2 RMSE
(a) 0.32% 25453.3 2.57% 4484.9 0.28% 1188.3 0.35% 3727.3 0.46
(b) 0.47% 21154.7 3.40% 3877.4 0.40% 994.5 0.48% 3144.7 0.45
(c) 0.66% 17755.8 4.36% 3407.3 0.54% 855.5 0.60% 2818.4 0.42
(d) 83.5% 643.4 99.76% 35.8 94.97% 14.5 83.5% 97.7 0.35
(e) 76.3% 805.9 66.09% 521.3 43.28% 72.1 35.0% 299.3 0.30
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Discussion
Our study shows an exponential growth of the number of
COVID-19 infections, health care demands and deaths in
Sweden which became apparent towards the end of March
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Figure 2 Top panel (a) The number of individuals in the Stockholm region
predicted to carry the virus over time as determined by a virus detection
assay. The empirical measurement from April 1st, 2020, using a popula-
tion sample, is illustrated by a circle (O) with 95% CI (vertical bars);
Bottom Panel (b) The cumulative number of predicted infected people
detected in an antibody test by the end of April (assuming antibodies can-
not be not detected immediately. The scenarios are organized in rows
with panel (a) no public health interventions (counterfactual scenario); (b)
modest physical distancing in ages 0–59 years, moderate in ages 60þ
years; (c) modest physical distancing in ages 0–59 years, moderately
strong in ages 60þ years; (d) moderate physical distancing in ages 0–59
years, very strong in ages 60–79 years, strong in ages 80þ years, and
with an increased degree of isolation of infectious individuals; (e) moder-
ate physical distancing in ages 0–59 years, strong in ages 60þ years, and
further improved isolation of infectious individuals. Mitigation giving rise
to these predicted values had onset the 20th of March.
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Mitigation giving rise to these predicted values had onset the 20th of
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and the beginning of April 2020. In April, it further sug-
gests a strong effect of the physical distancing efforts put
into place successively from around the middle of March
in Sweden. The epidemiological data from Sweden cur-
rently align best to our modelled secenario (d) which de-
scribe a moderate physical distancing in those <60 years of
age, a very strong distancing of those between 60 and79 -
years of age, strong distancing for ages 80þ years, and im-
proved awareness and compliance of home isolation of
symptomatic COVID-19 cases. So far, the level of physical
distancing and isolation has not seriously compromised ac-
cess to health care and has not overwhelmed the health
care system. The policy and measures were less stringent
and economically damaging compared with those intro-
duced in other Scandinavian countries (Norway, Finland,
Denmark), but the number of deaths per capita by early
June 2020 was much higher. According to the European
Centre for Disease Control (ECDC) situation update
worldwide published by the ECDC on 8 June 2020, there
were 461 deaths with 4429 confirmed infections per mil-
lion inhabitants in Sweden, versus 102 deaths with 2063
reported cases in Denmark, 44 deaths with 1569 cases in
Norway and 58 deaths with 1260 cases in Finland per mil-
lion inhabitants.19 In the counterfactual scenario (e.g. no
public health interventions), the intensive care unit demand
was estimated to be >20 times higher than the intensive
care capacity in Sweden and the number of deaths would
be between 40 000 and 70 000.
If the policy and behaviour change would continue
according to the development in scenario (d), our estimates
using the Swedish model of physical distancing without
lockdown show that by the end of August, 2020 just
<25% of the Swedish population will have been infected,
resulting in just >8000 deaths by that time point. Despite
such high exposure, Sweden would remain below the herd
immunity projected to stop the outbreak, a threshold esti-
mated to be in the range 40–70% assuming no pre-existing
immunity.20,21 Therefore, up to September 2020, the pre-
dicted impact is very dependent on ongoing adherence to
physical distancing and shielding of vulnerable age groups.
If such measures are not maintained, the consequences
would be severe with demands substantially exceeding
health care capacity and mortality rates rapidly increasing.
Natural herd immunity, i.e. a situation where R0 goes be-
low 1 even if countermeasures were discontinued, appears
not to be a viable objective to stop the virus circulation
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Figure 4 The predicted ICU bed demand per day from 24th of February
to the 1st of September, 2020, in the region of Stockholm in relation to
different suppression & mitigation scenarios. The scenarios are orga-
nized in rows with panel (a) no public health interventions (counterfac-
tual scenario); (b) modest physical distancing in ages 0–59 years,
moderate in ages 60þ years; (c) modest physical distancing in ages 0–
59 years, moderately strong in ages 60þ years; (d) moderate physical
distancing in ages 0–59 years, very strong in ages 60–79 years, strong
in ages 80þ years, and with an increased degree of isolation of
infectious individuals; (e) moderate physical distancing in ages 0–59
years, strong in ages 60þ years, and further improved isolation of infec-
tious individuals. Mitigation giving rise to these predicted values had
onset the 20th of March.
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given the predicted death tolls. A potential glimmer of
light, in such a scenario, is if some individuals previously
not exposed to SARS-CoV-2 can express T-cell reactivity,
contributing to some immunity.22 Further measures, in-
cluding enhanced testing, prompt isolation of cases, more
effective contact tracing and quarantining of contacts,23,24
would result in further reducing transmission intensity and
daily new cases, while avoiding lockdown, until other con-
trol options such as vaccine and effective therapeutic
options are readily available. We note, that scenario (d)
should not be seen as a forecast of the development of the
epidemic in Sweden, as it assumes that policy and behav-
iour (physical distancing, mobility and home isolation)
would remain the same as during the last 2 months of the
study period, which is unrealistic.
Of note, due to the strong triage in our model with only
15% of those aged 80þ being treated at the ICU, the de-
mand of this group is overall already estimated to be very
low. In order to capture the Swedish mortality patterns,
our model further estimates a substantial number of deaths
occurring outside hospitals, mainly in care homes. The ex-
cess mortality estimates published by the ECDC indicate a
substantial amount of additional deaths must have oc-
curred in Europe due to COVID-19.25 The total all-cause
mortality in Stockholm indicate that a confirmed COVID-
19 death is associated with an additional 0.40 (95% CI:
Table 2 Estimates of infections and healthcare demand aggregated over Sweden for the period 24 February to 1 September
2020, assuming intensive care capacity in Sweden increases by 100%, i.e. 1052 ICU beds in Sweden available for COVID-19
patients
Mitigation and suppression actions Total number
of individuals
infected
Person days
in in-patient
care
Person
days in
the ICU
Total number of
deaths assuming
all ICU demands
are satisfied
Total number
of deaths
from ICU
shortage
(a) No public health interventions (counterfactual scenario) 10 093 341 993 119 347 315 41 104 28 906
(b) Modest physical distancing in ages 0–59 years, moder-
ate in ages 60þ years
9 661 307 938 429 324 881 43 213 25 424
(c) Modest physical distancing in ages 0–59 years, moder-
ately strong in ages 60þ years
9 273 896 866 471 290 496 38 889 21 451
(d) Moderate physical distancing in ages 0–59 years, very
strong in ages 60–79 years, and strong in ages 80þ years,
and improved isolation of infectious individuals
2 477 887 171 266 41 231 8477 0
(e) Moderate physical distancing in ages 0–59 years, strong
in ages 60þ years, and further improved isolation of in-
fectious individuals
1 706 342 126 854 34 445 4912 0
Table 3 Estimates of direct costs of infections and healthcare demand aggregated over Sweden for the period 24 February to 1
September 2020
Mitigation and suppression actions Costs of cumulative
person days in in-patient
care (million SEK/2020)
Costs of cumulative
person days in intensive
care (million SEK/2020)
Total direct healthcare
costs (million SEK/2020)
(a) No public health interventions (counterfactual
scenario)
15 000 11 000 26 000
(b) Modest physical distancing in ages 0–59 years, mod-
erate in ages 60þ years
15 000 10 000 25 000
(c) Modest physical distancing in ages 0–59 years, mod-
erately strong in ages 60þ years
13 000 9000 22 000
(d) Moderate physical distancing in ages 0–59 years,
strong in ages 60þ years, and improved isolation of
infectious individuals
3000 1000 4000
(e) Moderate physical distancing in ages 0–59 years,
strong in ages 60þ years, and further improved isola-
tion of infectious individuals
2000 1000 3000
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0.24–0.57) all-causes death, e.g. 40% additional deaths be-
yond the confirmed COVID-19 cases reported.
In Sweden, we calibrated the rates of in-patient care
and critical care to be lower than those by Ferguson et al.13
for the UK (See Supplementary Table S1.2). Our results
show that the demand on ICU beds can be reduced not
only by a suppression strategy as successfully used in
China, but also by a mitigation strategy. However, deaths
cannot be effectively prevented in mitigation scenarios as
many of those would occur independent of ICU demands.
We note that, for the modes of death possible in our model
(see Supplementary Table S1.3, available as
Supplementary data at IJE online), the ICU demand can be
maintained at a lower level while deaths rise, which
appears to align well with the Swedish reported data in-
cluding a substantial number of deaths occurring outside
hospitals.
Our analyses address the impacts from COVID-19 on
the health-care demand, deaths and direct healthcare costs
in Sweden in relation to different public health interven-
tions. As such it is in line with the assessment of the
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control re-
garding the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that the direct
health-care related costs are substantial, ranging between 3
and 26 billion SEK dependent on the scenario. We show
that more stringent mitigation or suppression efforts yield
larger direct health care cost reductions compared with less
stringent mitigation or suppression, or the counterfactual
scenario, with the maximum cost difference estimated to
be 23 billion SEK. These cost estimates are likely an under-
estimation of the total costs because they only estimate the
direct costs within health care. Further on, the costs of the
health sector would need to be balanced against the cost to
the economy as a whole. The estimates here do not capture
impacts within healthcare from other acute health-
problems for which treatment is down prioritized or post-
poned due to the acute situation of the epidemic.
Furthermore, they does not consider economic impacts be-
yond the health sector.
In the model we do allow Re to vary between municipal-
ities and over time in response to the scenarios. However,
we do not allow substantial inhomogenity in Re, so called
superspreading, which could perhaps explain some of the
clustering patterns and events associated with the COVID-
19 pandemic.27 This is a limitation of our study, and if
superspreading is really an important characteristic of
COVID-19, our study does not capture such dynamics or
its response to the countermeasures in the scenarios.
However, with many people infected in a population, the
role of superspreading becomes less important as opportu-
nities for spread cease.28 We also did not consider the role
of seasonality, and it may be that we are failing to predict
a slowing down of transmission in the summer and a corre-
sponding risk of resurgence during the winter season.
Further on, underreporting, or asymptomatic transmission,
can be a driver of herd-immunity. Preliminary findings
from Iceland found no more than 50% asymptomatic car-
riers.29 Ferguson et al. estimated an Case Fatality Ratio
(CFR) of 1.6% and and IFR of 0.8% based on a 50%
asymptomatic rate.13 A Swedish study (the same as the
PCR based study used for the validation of the model),
prospectively measured and observed an IFR of 0.6%.
The study was based on a random sample from the
Stockholm region where individuals that were PCR posi-
tive for SARS-CoV-2 were followed up and the death fre-
quency recorded.30 Interestingly, our study estimates and
IFR are in agreement with this estimate when accounting
for the excess mortality of 40%.
Our study supports that public health interventions such
as social distancing combined with shielding of older per-
sons, even without a strict lockdown, can protect the health
care system by not exceeding ICU capacities. This interven-
tion strategy, however, thus far resulted in higher disease
burdens and deaths as compared with neighbouring coun-
tries with similar population densities that introduced more
stringent lockdown measures. In the longer run, it will be
important to evaluate both the health, society and economic
impacts of contrasting mitigation and suppression policies
to identify the best response to future pandemics.
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